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Experimental Design Issues in Big Data. The
Question of Bias
Elena Pesce, Eva Riccomagno, and Henry P. Wynn
Abstract Data can be collected in scientific studies via a controlled experiment or
passive observation. Big data is often collected in a passive way, e.g. from social me-
dia. In studies of causation great efforts are made to guard against bias and hidden
confounders or feedback which can destroy the identification of causation by cor-
rupting or omitting counterfactuals (controls). Various solutions of these problems
are discussed, including randomization.
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1 The challenges of experimental design with big data
The value of experimental design in physical and socio-medical fields is increas-
ingly realised, but at the same time systems under consideration are more complex.
It may not be possible to do a carefully controlled experiment in many areas, but
at the same time huge quantities of data are being produced, for example from so-
cial media and web-based transactions. An added problem is that the traditions of
experimental design differ. For example in engineering design it will be possible to
do a control experimental on a test bench, whereas in the social-medical sciences
the local counterfactual will be missing: we do not know how a particular patient
would have fared if they were not given the drug. Foundation work on these issues
is by [11]. Roughly, the causal effect can only be measured on the average, with
great care taken about the background population, with more reluctance than in the
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physical sciences to extend the conclusions outside the population under study. An
old issue, which goes back into the history of science, is the distinction between
active and passive observation. Is placing a sensor on a driverless car to collect data
(for control) an intervention in the sense of the declaration that to prove causation
you have to intervene? Despite these different historical traditions there seems to be
general agreement (i) that deriving causal models is a kind of gold standard and (ii)
that to produce a causal model we need to guard against bias from different sources:
hidden confounders, sampling bias, incomplete models, feedback and so on.
We cover a few of the ideas from the theory of causation (Section 2) and then
suggest that the double activity of building causal models while at the same time
guarding against bias has features of a cooperative game (Section 3.1). At its sim-
plest a randomized clinical trial is minimax solution to a game against the sources
of bias. With this in mind we make the natural but speculative suggestion that we
can import theories of Nash equilibrium and supply a simple example motivated by
the theory of optimum experimental design under a heading of optimal bias design.
We could have taken a Bayesian optimal design, for example from [7, 13]. But for
this short paper we felt it was enough to allow our randomness to come from the
error distribution or the randomization itself.
2 Causal Models
A major critique of passive analysis of the machine-learning type is the lack of
attention to the building of causal models. We discuss briefly the main ingredients
of causal graphical models and then the implications for experimental design [12].
A causal model is often described via a direct acyclic graph (DAG), G(E,V ),
where each vertex i ∈ V holds a (possibly vector) random variable Xi. Care has to
be taken with the edges i → j. The natural intuition that the edge means Xi causes
X j is not correct, at least not without much qualification. The DAG is a vehicle for
describing all conditional independence structures.
We can define a variable X j which is never observed as latent, also hidden. There
is a slight difference: hidden may be that we do not know it is there but it might
be. Latent may also be taken as expressing prior information. Thus a latent layer in
machine learning context may be included to allow a more complex model, such as
a mixture model.
The conundrum with causal models stems from the distinction between passive
observation and active experimental design. Experimental design is an intervention
and there are essentially two types. First, we can simply apply some kind of treat-
ment at node i to obtain a special Xi, for example give a patient i a drug. Second,
and even more active, one can set variable Xi to say high and low levels.
Passive observation means that a joint sampling distribution covers all observed
Xi. The act of setting should be thought as advantageous in the sense that we are in
some kind of classical or optimal design framework, but disadvantageous in that it
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is destructive. Roughly, setting Xi destroys our ability to learn about the population
from which Xi comes.
Consider a simple DAG: X1 −→ X2 −→ X3 −→ X4 and for ease of explanation
we write down a univariate linear version with obvious interpretation
X1 = θ0+ ε1 X2 = θ1X1+ ε2
X3 = θ2X2+ ε3 X4 = θ3X3+ ε4
where {εi}i=1,...,4 are error variables. Suppose we are interested in the last causal
parameter θ3. Ideal would be to carry out a controlled experiment, setting the levels
of X3 and observing X4. The first assumption to make is governed by the following:
Principal 1. The distribution of X4 conditional on a set value of X3 is the same as
when the same value of X3 was passively observed.
There are arguments to justify this but it remains a most important assumption.
We can also passively observe X1,X2,X3,X4. Note that the model is nonlinear in the
parameters as X4 = θ0θ1θ2θ3 + θ1θ2θ3ε1 + θ2θ3ε2 + θ3ε3 + ε4 and also that X4 is
Gaussian if the {εi} are Gaussian. One may not have to choose between a controlled
experiment and passive observation. This lead to another principal, see [6]
Principal 2. A mixture of passive observation experiment and active experimen-
tation may be optimal.
There is considerable discussion in trying to understand how to learn for DAG
models with interventions, and controlled experiments are a form of intervention.
Most effort has been put into identifiability; see [4] for a review. In our example
suppose there is an extra arrow X1→ X4. Such an arrow is referred to as a backdoor.
If the index is time we can say that there is another path from X1 into the future in
addition to X1 → X2 → X3 → X4.
X1 X2 X3
X4 X5
Now if we fix X3 we cannot so simply estimate θ3 because the distribution of X4
is corrupted by the new path. In the observational case, we have another parameter
and the changed equation
X4 = θ3X3+θ4X1+ ε4. (1)
There are now too many parameters for the observations (even with replication).
The celebrated backdoor theorem due to [10] tells us how to obtain identifiabil-
ity. Suppose you want to see whether Xi causes X j, then we need two conditions for
a good conditioning set of variables S:
1. No node (variable) in S is a descendent of Xi
2. S blocks every (backdoor) path from Xi to X j that has an arrow into Xi.
This theorem tell us: (i) whether there is confounding given this DAG, (ii) if it is
possible to remove the confounding and (iii) which variables to condition on to
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eliminate the confounding. For example, if we are trying to establish the effect of
X3 on X4 then we must observe, or set and condition on, any Xi which is not a
descendant of X3 and blocks all paths from, in our case, ancestors of X3. In addition,
if there are any other downstream (future) variable such as an extra X5 with X4→X5,
then X5 will not interfere with our causal analysis; we can forget it. In summary
Principal 3. Guard against effects from nuisance confounders by suitable addi-
tional conditioning.
3 Bias Models
Before presenting our contribution, we briefly review relevant literature. For the
model without bias
E [Yi] = θ
T f (xi) (2)
with θ ∈Rp, xi ∈X for i = 1, . . . ,n, and the usual assumptions on the random error,
[3] and [15] propose information-based and sequential algorithms (also response
adaptive in [3]) for the selection of a subsample from a large, or possibly big, dataset.
They provide an optimal subsample with respect to a chosen utility function.
Bias model and optimal design of experiments were considered by [9] and re-
cently in the context of big data by [16]. Those authors add a bias term δ T h to the
model (2) and thus study E [Yi] = θ
T f (xi)+δ
T h(xi). They search for a design which
minimises the mean square error of the least square estimator of the θ parameters,
guarding θ from the bias term. In particular [16] proposes a theory of minimax I-
and D-robust design as subset of a large finite set of points, while [9] proves results
for a design to be optimal when the effect of the bias term is bounded above from a
given constant and below from zero.
The conditioning argument of the backdoor theorem is a way of avoiding biases.
In the above example in Equation (1) θ4 gives a bias. Enough conditioning creates a
kind of laboratory inside which we can conduct our experiment by setting the level
of X3. Sometimes this is referred to as creating a Markov blanket. But there are
sources of bias which either we do not know at all or have some ideas about but are
too costly to control. Biases range from those we really know about but simply do
not observe to those which are introduced to model additional variability. This will
affect the overall distribution of the observed variables, in a way similar to classical
factor analysis.
Principal 4. Special models are needed to ascertain and guard against hidden
sources of bias, for example using randomization or latent variable methods.
We build on the ideas in [9] and discuss in details how optimal experimental
design can guard against hidden sources of bias, indicated below with the letter z.
Thus consider a two part model in which the first part is the causal model of main
interest with parameters θ and the second part is the bias term with parameters
φ . This separation is familiar from traditional experimental design where θ and φ
might be treatment and block parameters, respectively, [1, 9]. The model is:
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Yi = θ
T f (xi)+φ
T g(zi)+ εi (3)
where the εi are independent and have equal variance σ
2.
We want to protect the usual least square estimator, θˆ , obtained from the reduced
model in Equation (2) ignoring the bias term φT g(zi). Define the full moment matrix
by
M =
∫
( f (x)T ,g(z)T )T ( f (x)T ,g(z)T )ξx,z d(x,z) =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
,
where ξx,z is the experimental design measure over (x,z)-space. Then the mean
squared error (MSE) matrix can be written as
E{(θˆ −θ )(θˆ −θ )T}= σ2N−1R
where
R = M−111 +M
−1
11 M12ψψ
T M21M
−1
11 = S1+ S2
with ψ = Nσ φ the standardised bias parameter and N the sample size (see [9]).
Well known criteria for optimality ask to minimise over the choice of experi-
mental design the quantity: trace(R) = trace(S1) + trace(S2) (the trace criteria or
A-optimality) or det(R) = det(S1)
(
1+ψT M21M
−1
11 M12ψ
)
(the D-optimality crite-
ria).
The design problem is easier when the design space and design D are direct
products and thus can be written as
X ×Z , D = D1×D2 (4)
with x ∈ X and z ∈ Z , D1 and D2 are finite subsets of, respectively, X and Z .
Then, trace(R) includes a termwhich depends only onD1, likewise a factor in det(R)
depends only on D1.
The most familiar example is from clinical trials where one compares a treatment
against a control. Consider the simple case
Y1i = θ1+θ2+φ(z1i− z¯)+ εi
Y2 j = θ1−θ2+φ(z2 j − z¯)+ ε j,
where the zi are unwanted confounders which may be a source of bias, the z¯ is the
grand mean and n = N/2 points are allocated to each group. Adapting the above
analysis we obtain
M =
X ′X
N
=

1 0 00 1 (z¯1− z¯2)/2
0 (z¯1− z¯2)/2 s

 ,
where the z¯i, i= 1,2, terms are the groupmeans andNs=∑
n
i=1(z1i− z¯)
2+∑ni=1(z2i−
z¯)2. The bias term is trace(S2) = ψ
2(z¯1− z¯2)
2/4 which is zero when z¯1 = z¯2. This
is the simplest case of balance and extends easily to multivariate z. A number of
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methods of achieving balance have been studied, each of which can be cast in the
above framework
1. Stratification: balancing in each stratum and then aggregating the difference.
2. Distance methods: pairing up treatment and control with which are close in z-
space with respect to some distance such as Mahalanobis distance [8].
3. Propensity score. This much researched method seeks to balance in such way as
to ensure that the bias correction is extended to a larger parent population [11,
12]. Some adaptation of the above method analysis is possible in this case.
3.1 A Game Theoretic Approach
For ease of explanation we introduce two players: Alice (A) and Bob (B). Alice
selects a causal model design D1 using {θ , f} and Bob selects design D2 using
{φ ,g}. In the product case (4), Alice and Bob can operate separately. In other cases
they may cooperate fully to find the best design over the design space for the pair
(x,z). However there is another possibility, namely to use a Nash equilibrium ap-
proach [2, 5, 14].
For two players A and B with composite cost functions C1(u,v),C2(u,v) and
solutions u∗,v∗ at equilibrium it holds
Alice : u∗ = argmin
u
C1(u,v
∗)
Bob : v∗ = argmin
v
C2(u
∗,v)
We illustrate the presence of Nash equilibrium in causation-bias set up by a simple
example. We take a distorted design space, but still a product-type design measure.
Thus, let the model be
E(Y ) = θ0+θ1x+φz
and let the design have a four support points (we put the design measure in the
second line):
{
(1,1), (0,1), (0,−1), (−1,−1)
αβ , (1−α)β , α(1−β ), (1−α)(1−β )
}
,
where 0≤ α,β ≤ 1
Since, in this case, M12 is a 2× 1 column vector:
trace(S2) = ψ
2M21M
−2
11 M12
The equilibrium takes the form:
Alice : α∗ = argminα trace(S1)
Bob : β ∗ = argminβ trace(S2)
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There are two Nash equilibria given by solving ∂∂α trace(S1) =
∂
∂β trace(S2) = 0.
This gives two solutions (α∗,β ∗) and ( 1
2
, 1
2
) with α∗ = 0.59306 and β ∗ = 0.08274
computed numerically. Note that both solutions do not depend on ψ , and in fact
scale invariance of this kind is a well known feature of Nash equilibrium.
We can compare the solution with an overall optimisation by setting ψ = 1 and
minimizing trace(S1) + trace(S2). The minimum is 4, it is achieved at (α,β ) =
( 1
2
, 1
2
)with (trace(S1), trace(S2))=(3,1). Whereas at (α
∗,β ∗) the value of trace(S1)+
trace(S2) is approximated to 5.1735 with (trace(S1), trace(S2))=(4.483,0.6905).
Let us return to the role of Bob in our narrative. His experimental design decision
will depend on his knowledge about the bias. For ease of explanation we reduce the
argument to two canonical cases.
Approach 1. Unknown ψ
trace(S2) = trace
(
M−111 M12ψψ
T M21M
−1
11
)
= ψT Q1ψ
Q1 = M21M
−2
11 M12.
Under a restriction ||ψ ||= 1 this achieves a maximum at the maximum eigenvalue:
λmax(Q1). We can take this as our criterion which is close to the E-optimality of
optimum design theory.
Approach 2. In equation (3), for unknown φT g(z) = h(z) ∈H in some function
class, we have
||E(θˆ )−θ ||2 = h(z)T Q2 h(z)
Q2 = X1M
−2
11 X
T
1
where X1 = [ f (x)]x∈D1 . We cannot optimise over x (X1) because, in our narrative,
Alice needs it for the causal parameter θ . A solution is then
min
Pz
EZ
{
max
h∈H
(
h(z)T Q2 h(z)
)}
,
where Pz is the randomization distribution. In the language of game theory this is a
mixed strategy to achieve a minimax solution.
Randomisation has been heralded as one of the most important contributions of
statistics to scientific discovery. There are several arguments put forward for using
randomization: (i) it helps support assumptions of exchangeability in a Bayesian
analysis (ii) it supports classical zero mean and equal variance arguments and (iii) it
produces roughly balanced samples.
4 Conclusion
After a discussion of some issues related to the use of experimental design to help
establish causation in complex models, we study in a little more detail the use of op-
timal design methods to remove bias. In the standard case the causal part of a model
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can be estimated orthogonally from the bias. In more complex cases the problem can
be set up as a co-operative game. We demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibria
for a small example and point to a formulation which would include randomization.
This is preliminary work, establishing model classes (for example special h’s, H ’s,
Pz’s) and conditions on D for which Approaches 1 and 2 can be turned into efficient
algorithms is object of current work. The general proposition is that such methods
will help protect causal models against bias.
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